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Two Traditions of Democratic Theory
In the past decade the theory of democracy has been dominated by two very different approaches. Within democratic theory as conventionally defined the strongest current is now deliberative. 1 For deliberative democrats, the essence of democratic legitimacy is the capacity of those affected by a collective decision to deliberate in the production of that decision. Deliberation involves discussion in which individuals are amenable to scrutinizing and changing their preferences in light of persuasion (but not manipulation, deception, or coercion) from other participants. Claims for and against courses of action must be justified to others in terms they can accept. Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, respectively the most influential continental and Anglo-American political philosophers of the late 20 th century, have both identified themselves as deliberative democrats. 2 Deliberative democrats are uniformly optimistic that deliberation yields rational collective outcomes.
The main competing tradition is social choice theory, whose proponents generally deduce far less optimistic results. To social choice theorists, the democratic problem involves aggregation of views, interests, or preferences across individuals, not deliberation over their content. From the seminal work of Kenneth Arrow on, it has been argued that such aggregation is bedeviled by impossibility, instability and arbitrariness. 3 Arrow proved the non-existence of any aggregation mechanism satisfying a set of seemingly innocuous conditions. This critique of democracy was radicalized by William Riker, who argued that any notion of a popular will independent of the mechanism used to aggregate preferences was untenable. 4 Given that there is no good reason to choose any particular mechanism over any other, supposedly democratic collective choices are arbitrary, and democracy is emptied of meaning. As Hardin puts it, social choice theory has exposed "flaws -grievous foundational flaws -in democratic thought and practice." 5 Riker's radicalization of the social-choice-theoretic critique created a chasm between the two traditions that might seem impossible to bridge. 6 We argue that the two traditions can in fact be reconciled. Though social choice practitioners may be unaware of it, some even arguing the opposite, we argue that their theory points to the functions deliberation can perform in making collective decisions both tractable and meaningful, thus providing a crucial service to deliberative democracy.
The structure of this paper follows the results of social choice theory, for it is these that both pose the challenges to democracy and pinpoint the locations at which deliberative responses must be sought.
Methodologically, our arguments consist of a logical component, a normative component and an empirical-hypothetical component. The logical component takes an "if-then"-form: If condition X obtains, then, by the logic of social choice theory, meaningful collective decisions are possible. The normative component defends the claim that the constraints required for bringing about condition X are inherent in or consistent with core elements of deliberative democracy. The empirical-hypothetical component, finally, seeks to render plausible the empirical hypothesis that deliberation facilitates the emergence of condition X. While we provide empirical illustrations, more systematic testing is beyond our scope here.
The Social-Choice-Theoretic Challenge
Before we explicate some of the impossibility results at the centre of the social-choicetheoretic critique of democracy (2.2) and describe how they are usually invoked (2.3), we briefly sketch what we take to be the essence of social choice theory (2.1).
Disentangling Social Choice Theory from Rational Choice Theory
Social choice theory is a mathematical theory of group decision making. Its concern is not so much the empirical question of how groups actually do make decisions, rather the normative and logical questions of how they should, and could, aggregate information about the views, interests, or preferences of individuals into group decisions. The normative aspect is the specification of minimal conditions an acceptable aggregation mechanism must satisfy. The logical aspect is the identification of the class of logically possible aggregation mechanisms satisfying a given set of conditions. But the purely logical side of social choice theory will not favour one such set of conditions over another.
Hence Riker's argument that there is no popular will independent of a particular aggregation mechanism is not in itself a decisive challenge to democracy: without normative input in the form of a favoured set of conditions, it is impossible to design a social choice mechanism. One of the roles of deliberation is to seek agreement on such a set of conditions.
While social choice theorists often model individuals as self-interested utility maximizers, 7 there is no reason why the purely logical and normative analysis of aggregation mechanisms should presuppose any specific behavioural assumption. Social choice theory is, then, distinct from, and not committed to the premises of, rational choice theory.
Nonetheless, an empirical account of individual behaviour may (implicitly) affect the normative choice of minimal conditions on aggregation. For instance, if, empirically, human beings tend to distort information when expedient, we may require that aggregation mechanisms minimize people's incentives to manipulate information (an example of such a condition is strategy-proofness as discussed below). Such rational-choice-theoretic premises may or may not turn out to be empirically adequate. Our point is simply that social choice theory and rational choice theory should not be conflated.
Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
To introduce Arrow's theorem, we recall Condorcet's paradox of cyclical majority preferences. Suppose there are three individuals, labelled 1, 2 and 3, and three alternatives, labelled x, y and z, with the following preferences:
Then there are majorities of 2 out of 3 individuals for x > y, for y > z and for z > x. The resulting majority preference ordering is cyclical: x > y > z > x.
Arrow's theorem generalizes Condorcet's insight. 8 We consider a set of individuals (e.g.
voters, decision-makers, committee members), labelled N = {1, 2, ..., n}, and a set of alternatives (e.g.
policy options, election candidates), labelled X = {x, y, z, ...}. 9 To each individual, 
Universal Domain (U).
The domain of F is the set of all logically possible profiles of personal preference orderings.
Weak Pareto Principle (P).
If, for all i in N, xP i y, then xPy.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (I).
The position of x relative to y in the social ordering R depends exclusively on the position of x relative to y in each of the personal preference orderings in {R i } i∈N .
Non-Dictatorship (D)
. F is not dictatorial: there does not exist an i in N such that, for all {R i } i∈N in the domain of F and all x and y in X, xP i y implies xPy.
Theorem 1.
There exists no SWF F (generating transitive social orderings) which satisfies (U), (P), (I) and (D).
12 By Arrow's theorem, any SWF F will of logical necessity violate at least one of (U), (P), (I) and (D). Any democratic decision mechanism thus exhibits at least one of the following flaws: a failure to generate a determinate social ordering for certain profiles of personal preference orderings (if (U) is violated), inefficiency by sometimes ranking Pareto-suboptimal alternatives above Paretooptimal ones (if (P) is violated), manipulability by changes of the set of options X (the 'agenda') (if (I) is violated), or dictatorship (if (D) is violated). Moreover, relaxation of the requirement that social orderings be transitive does not solve the problem. The weaker requirement of quasi-transitivity may still give rise to a so-called oligarchy.
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To state the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, define a social choice function (SCF) to be an aggregation function F whose input is a profile of personal preference orderings and whose output is a single winning alternative in X. 14 Pairwise majority voting also provides an example of a SCF. A Condorcet winner is defined to be a top-ranked alternative in a Condorcet ordering. Now pairwise majority voting is the function F mapping each {R i } i∈N to a corresponding Condorcet winner. In analogy to Arrow's theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is concerned with SCFs in general, abstracting from pairwise majority voting. In addition to (U) and (D) 15 , two minimal conditions are imposed on a SCF F:
The Range-Constraint (R). The range of F contains at least three distinct alternatives in X.
F is manipulable by individual i at the profile {R i } i∈N if the following condition holds:
Strategic Incentives (SI). If i submits a false preference ordering R' i (where R' i ≠R i ), then F selects an alternative y' that is strictly better from the perspective of i's true preference ordering than the alternative y that would be selected by F if i submitted the true preference ordering R i -formally y'P i y, where y' = F({R 1 , ..., R' i , ..., R n }) and y = F({R 1 , ..., R i , ..., R n }).
Strategy-Proofness (S).
There does not exist a profile {R i } i∈N at which F is manipulable by some i in N.
As indicated in section 2.1, (S) is a (normative) condition whose appeal is closely linked with an empirical assumption. If, empirically, individuals act on the incentives for manipulation provided by situations of type (SI), then a condition that rules out the occurrence of such situations, namely condition (S), is normatively attractive. In section 3.2, we challenge the plausibility of this empirical assumption in a deliberative setting.
Theorem 2.
There exists no SCF F which satisfies (U), (R), (D) and (S). 16 By the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, any SCF will violate at least one of (U), (R), (D) and (S). Given any SCF F, at least one of the following flaws thus seems inevitable: a failure to generate a determinate winning alternative for certain profiles of personal preference orderings (if (U) is violated), insensitivity to individuals' views, interests, or preferences (if (R) is violated), dictatorship
The problem of strategic manipulation becomes even more intractable if we allow the possibility of counterthreats of the form "if you submit false preferences, then so will I/we". 17 
Two Ways to Deploy Impossibility Arguments
In the sporadic encounters between deliberative democracy and social choice theory, the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems have been deployed to support diametrically opposed positions.
From the direction of deliberative democracy, Sunstein argues, citing Arrow, that "it is doubtful that private desires or even aspirations can be well-aggregated through the process of majority rule", thus proving the necessity for deliberation across those holding initially different preferences. 19 But this invocation merely asserts deliberation's superiority through reference to the problems of aggregation; it does not show why deliberation avoids the same problems. Elster holds that under deliberation "there would not be any need for an aggregating mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences." 20 However, it is surely overly optimistic to expect that rational discussion will always produce unanimity, so even after discussion-induced preference changes aggregation of conflicting preferences may be necessary. Miller argues that deliberation produces preference profiles that satisfy single-peakedness, 21 24 Against this interpretation of the conditions of deliberation as lack of structure, we argue that there are "structuration" processes endogenous to deliberation that can speak to the problems highlighted by social choice theory.
A Deliberative Response
Each condition of Arrow's theorem and of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem points towards a potential escape-route from the impossibility problems. If any one of these conditions is relaxed, there exist social choice procedures satisfying all the others, and such procedures can, in principle, be employed in democratic decision making. The problem, according to social-choice-theoretic critics, is that all these conditions are so basic that weakening even one would yield undesirable consequences.
If we relax (I) or (S), for example, we would solve the impossibility problems seemingly at the expense of, respectively, possible agenda manipulation or possible submission of false preferences.
However, we argue in sections 3.2 to 3.4 that a relaxation of each of (S), (U) and (I) is an option in a deliberative setting. In section 3.5 we discuss an escape-route from Arrow's theorem that is -at first sight surprisingly -consistent with all of Arrow's conditions.
We explained above that our arguments consist of a logical "if-then" component, a normative component and an empirical-hypothetical component. The "if-then" component is given by socialchoice-theoretic possibility results. The aim of deliberation must then be to impose certain constraints on democratic decision processes required for satisfying the antecedents of these "if-then" results. The normative component of our arguments defends the use of these constraints as consistent with, or even inherent in, deliberation. In some of our arguments, particularly those in sections 3.4 and 3.5, the recognition that the requisite constraints could be consistently implemented in the institutions of a deliberative democracy does most of the work -whether they will be implemented is of course a different matter. Other arguments, particularly those in sections 3.2 and 3.3, depend more crucially on empirical hypotheses, which require further empirical corroboration.
But first we introduce some conceptual tools to classify aggregation problems and those aspects of deliberation that can be brought to bear.
A Simple Taxonomy of Decision Processes in a Deliberative Democracy
We use two (purely formal) criteria for the classification of aggregation problems that fit our description of social choice theory: There are now four sub-categories of JD: JD-nv, JD-nd, JD-dv, and JD-dd. In reality, criteria culture could take this form, where highly opinionated agents are unwilling as a matter of "discursive machismo" to subject their ideas to deliberative scrutiny. 27 However, this outcome would be contingent on substantial immediate agreement among the agents on what is obviously right ("Claro!"
is a conversational putdown that translates as "Obvious!").
Deliberative democrats highlight JD-dv and JD-dd -we discuss such decision problems in We suggest that each of these aspects plays a role in facilitating the solution of social-choicetheoretic problems.
Relaxing Strategy-Proofness
In this section we propose the empirical hypothesis that We argue that deliberation can have (at least) one of two effects:
Explicitly changing the incentives. In a deliberative setting, there may be risks and penalties attached to informational deception and false disclosure of preferences, i.e. untruthfulness may be costly, and hence an individual may no longer be better off if they reveal false preferences.
Thus deliberation may transform situations in which, without deliberation, property (SI) would hold into ones in which property (SI) no longer holds.
Effect 2: Inducing in individuals a greater cooperative disposition. We have noted in section 2.2 that, when property (SI) holds, decisions about whether or not to submit true preferences may have a structure similar to a (one-shot) prisoners' dilemma, where truthfulness corresponds to cooperation and submission of false preferences corresponds to defection. Deliberation may increase the likelihood that individuals will cooperate, i.e. that they will submit true preferences, and hence that they will no longer act on the incentives provided by (SI).
We now address the two effects in greater detail. Let us first consider effect 1. From a rational-choice standpoint, Austen-Smith analyses talk in strategic terms: it can convey information, but never change preferences, which are prior and exogenous to the decision process. 29 Information conveyed in talk is selective and possibly false, "potentially influential only insofar as it alters individuals' beliefs about how actions map onto consequences". 30 Listeners are aware of the possibility of deception, and so calculate whether or not to believe speakers. If there are no punishments for being exposed as a liar, then there are no incentives for truthfulness.
However, if interaction is recurrent, there are penalties for being exposed as a liar; nobody will believe you the next time. 31 The incentives for truthfulness created by recurrent interaction parallel the incentives for cooperation in repeated (as opposed to one-shot) prisoners' dilemmas. 32 But even in one-shot interactions a deliberative setting may create incentives for truthfulness.
Austen-Smith stresses the informational (inf) aspect of deliberation and how agents will calculate what information to believe, to manipulate and to reveal. First, introducing multiple speakers helps to create incentives for truthfulness by enabling corroboration of information. 33 Second, beyond the informational (inf) aspect of deliberation, the argumentative (arg) and reflective (ref) aspects actually constrain the individuals' opportunities for manipulation.
Consider, for instance, a truly canny actor i intent on taking advantage of the deliberative revelation of preferences by others, while "hanging back" to disclose his/her own preferences selectively and possibly deceptively. Suppose i's true preference ordering is xP i yP i z. After listening to others reveal their preferences, i perceives that x has a better chance of beating z than beating y, so i then pretends to have an ordering xP i zP i y. However, the reflective (ref) aspect of deliberation means that i must justify this false ordering. There is a risk that the others will not believe that i is sincere.
The best case that i can make for revealing the preference ordering xP i zP i y late in the day is that he/she has been persuaded of this ordering by the preceding deliberation. Yet such a lie is risky, because the content of deliberation has actually advanced the standing of y, not z -otherwise there would be no reason for i to act strategically against y here. In short, the reflective (ref) aspect of deliberation constrains strategic and deceptive disclosure of preferences. Now, it might be argued that in partisan settings (such as a legislature) skilful prevarication may actually be admired, at least by members of one's own side, outweighing any incentives to truthfulness. But effect 1 holds to the degree the setting has any deliberative aspects at allprevaricators risk destruction of their stock of credibility, which in turn is necessary to make any effective deliberative interventions. Assemblies are only completely partisan in political systems on the verge of disintegration. Thus effect 1 works in "adversary" and "unitary" democracies alike, in
Mansbridge's classification. 34 In our discussion of effect 2, we will now address a different mechanism that may induce truthfulness in one-shot interactions. We argue that deliberation's social (soc) aspect may promote the individuals' cooperative disposition. A robust empirical finding in experiments on one-shot prisoners' dilemmas is that a period of discussion within the group prior to each individual choice between cooperation and defection increases the proportion of cooperative choice. 35 This result falsifies the rational-choice prediction that individuals should still defect, because the payoff structure of the choice situation is unchanged by discussion: indeed, the more confident any one individual becomes during this discussion that others will cooperate, the more that person should calculate that the payoff from defection will increase.
How do we explain discussion-induced cooperation? Discussion provides participants with opportunities for multi-lateral promise-making about the choices they will make. 36 Rational choice theory would predict that in one-shot interactions such promises will be broken, but empirical evidence suggests that social norms and/or psychological dispositions in favour of keeping promises are more powerful. Even when experimental conditions are modified to ensure that the discussion is on topics irrelevant to the choice between cooperation and defection, thus ruling out explicit promisemaking, discussion still increases the proportion of cooperators. Proposed explanations range from an evolutionary-psychological or social trust mechanism, by which exposing one's vulnerability to others makes it less likely that they will exploit that vulnerability 37 , to the idea that people are trustresponsive because there is a positive payoff in being seen by others as cooperative and trustworthy. 38 Is evidence from stylized dilemma games relevant to the real world of deliberation, particularly its social aspect (soc)? A decision-theoretic explanation of how cooperation can be triggered even in one-shot interactions suggests a mechanism that may work in both laboratories and the real world. People's preferences are not description invariant: an agent's preferences depend not only on a decontextualized payoff matrix, but also on a decision-frame, "the decision-maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice". 39 Varying an agent's frame can lead to major preference changes, up to complete reversal.
self-regarding preferences in games framed in social contexts than in games framed in market contexts. 41 The cooperative disposition of an agent is also connected with the question of whether the agent conceptualizes a given situation in terms of an "I"-frame of self-interest, or a "we"-frame of collective interest. 42 Experimental conditions as undemanding as asking subjects to edit a text by circling all occurrences of "we", "us" and "our" have been shown to induce use of the "we"-frame. 43 We hypothesize that deliberation can have a similar effect of making a "we"-frame of collective interest focal; and that this effect can still occur in adversarial settings, provided only that they have some deliberative component.
There is, then, some evidence in support of hypothesis 1: we may expect deliberative talk to be truthful rather than manipulative. And we have argued that, if hypothesis 1 is correct, then this would open up an escape-route from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
Relaxing Universal Domain
The threat Arrow's problem poses to democratic decision-making depends on the level of diversity across different individuals' preferences. In (rare) cases of unanimity, aggregation is easy.
But, as noted above, it is overly optimistic to expect deliberation to produce unanimity. Moreover, while unanimity is a sufficient condition for avoiding Arrow's problem, it is not a necessary one; preference structuration, exemplified by Black's condition of single-peakedness, 44 is already a sufficient condition. We will discuss the implications of this observation for deliberative democracy. 
implies xP i z. Table 2 gives an example of two preference orderings over the alternatives x, y, z, v, w which are single-peaked with respect to the same dimension Ω (ordering the alternatives from 'left' to 'right' in the order x, z, v, y, w). Single-peakedness can be related to a distinction between two different concepts of agreement: agreement at a substantive level and agreement at a meta-level. 52 Two or more individuals agree at a substantive level to the extent that their preferences are the same -the perfect case being unanimity. But it is also possible for two or more individuals to disagree on how to rank alternatives, and yet to agree on a common dimension in terms of which the alternatives are to be conceptualized. 
One Dimensional Preference Structuration
In this section, we discuss the hypothesis that Hypothesis 2. The profile of personal preference orderings {R i } i∈N after a period of group deliberation will satisfy (or approximate) single-peakedness.
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It might be argued that rationality requires one determinate dimension on which preferences are single-peaked, whose identification enables a group to criticize as irrational personal preference orderings which have more than one peak on that dimension. As most individuals would eschew appearing irrational, this itself might induce single-peakedness. However, someone may have good reasons for having preferences with more than one peak on the identified dimension; this individual's preferences may be single-peaked along a different, but still reasonably explicable, dimension. However, there are other noncoercive ways in which deliberation can narrow the domain of actually occurring preference profiles. Deliberation may rule out arguments that cannot withstand deliberative scrutiny. Deliberative theorists often stress the invocation of interests "generalizable" to deliberators, and to their society. Arguments couched in such terms are more persuasive than those couched in terms of the interests of some subgroup, which in turn are more persuasive than those couched in terms of the interests of specific individuals. 56 Preference orderings denying the personal integrity and political equality of other actual or potential deliberators are not easily sustained, for participation in deliberation has to bring to mind the interests of these others. 57 One kind of generalizable interest is the economist's idea of a public good, which can only be supplied jointly and indivisibly to all individuals, such as ecological integrity. Another kind is access to the basic needs of life (food, shelter, education etc.), formalizable in Sen's notion of functionings or in Rawls's notion of primary goods (on such 'divisible' kinds of generalizable interest, see section 3.5).
But is an appeal to a generalizable interest sufficient to induce (a greater level of) singlepeakedness? We suggest that, if, through deliberation, (i) a particular generalizable interest becomes focal and (ii) this generalizable interest can be associated with a single dimension, then (a high level of) single-peakedness is a likely consequence. 58 The mechanism can be described as follows. this dimension why subsidies should also go to large agribusinesses. Imagine three policy alternatives:
x = subsidies for all farms, y = subsidies for family farms only, z = no subsidies. Assuming material self-interest, the preference ordering for agribusiness is xP i zP i y (z is preferred to y because subsidies for family farms only would hurt the competitive position of agribusiness), for family farmers yP i xP i z,
and for taxpayers zP i yP i x. If none of the three groups controls a majority but each pair of them does, then there is a cycle across x, y and z. But if deliberation induces a need for rationalization along
Riker's lines, agribusiness's preference ordering cannot be sustained, and the cycle is broken. In short, deliberation-induced rationalization may narrow the domain of preference profiles.
Elster speaks of the "civilizing force of hypocrisy" accompanying deliberation. 61 Perhaps becoming civilized in Elster's terms involves 'finding one's peak' on the publicly identified issuedimension. A more sanguine view of motivation would see individuals truly adopt positions they can sustain publicly. 62 Even if individuals privately cling to their original preference orderings, proposals are likely to be crafted only in response to publicly sustainable orderings. should receive priority when these public interests clash.
However, as we see in section 3.3.3, empirical evidence supports hypothesis 1 -even in its above stated onedimensional form.
Multidimensional Preference Structuration
As we argued in section 3.3.1, if preferences focus on a single dimension, then singlepeakedness is not a demanding requirement. Thus if a profile of personal preference orderings {R i } i∈N violates single-peakedness, the reason might be that preferences are determined by more than one dimension. This leads us to propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.
(i) Group deliberation leads to the identification of those issue-dimensions that are considered relevant to a given decision problem, represented by the numerals 1, 2, …, k (the identification of dimensions condition).
( To illustrate, imagine a committee having difficulties deciding what level of tariffs to impose on imports. One person claims a first preference for free trade, a second preference for a blanket tariff, a third preference for a selective tariff. Upon questioning, she might say that she prefers zero to blanket to selective tariffs because a selective tariff will cause inequity across industrial sectors. Thus she reveals two dimensions: open/closed trade and equity/inequity -with a greater importance placed on the former -on both of which her preference ordering has only one peak. Other members might then rank their preferences on both these dimensions, producing a single-peaked profile on each dimension (assuming no complications from these other preference orderings). They still face the problem of aggregation across these two dimensions, but we turn to this issue below.
Given the intradimensional single-peakedness condition of hypothesis 3, theorems 4 and 5
imply that separate dimension-specific aggregation can yield a social ordering or a socially most preferred alternative (particularly, a Condorcet winner) for each dimension in accordance with
Arrow's conditions (I), (P), (D) or the Gibbard-Satterthwaite conditions (R), (D) and (S).
There are at least four ways in which dimension-specific aggregation can help solve a collective decision problem.
Subdividing the decision. For decision problems which can be subdivided into several independent dimension-specific sub-decisions, identification of the dimensions of these sub-decisions and subsequent dimension-specific aggregation might be sufficient, provided that the relevance of each of these dimensions is publicly accepted and that deliberation can induce sufficient single- on the dimensions of (a) ecological sustainability, (b) employment, and (c) economic growth, they may still disagree on the relative importance of each dimension. In the most general case, the problem of aggregating k dimension-specific profiles into a single social ordering, rather than into k dimension-specific orderings, raises problems similar to Arrow's problem, even if each dimensionspecific profile satisfies single-peakedness.
Theorem 6.
69 Let F be an aggregation function whose input is a vector of k dimensionspecific profiles of personal preference orderings <{R i1 } i∈N , {R i2 } i∈N , ..., {R ik } i∈N > and whose output is a social ordering R over the alternatives in X. Suppose F is defined for all vectors of dimensionspecific profiles where each dimension-specific profile satisfies single-peakedness (i.e. the domain that would result from hypothesis 3), and suppose F satisfies (P) and (I). 70 Then F will make one dimension dominant: there exists a fixed dimension j such that, for all inputs in the domain of F and all x and y in X, if all individuals rank x above y in dimension j -i.e. xP ij y for all i -, then xPy.
The only aggregation functions satisfying the conditions of theorem 6 are (possibly lexicographic) hierarchies of dimensions. The overall social ordering is determined, first, exclusively on the basis of the dimension-specific profile {R ij } i∈N corresponding to the highest-ranked dimension;
only if there are ties, the dimension-specific profile corresponding to the second-highest-ranked dimension acts as a tie-breaker; only if there are still ties, the dimension-specific profile corresponding to the third-highest ranked dimension acts as a tie-breaker, and so on. A lexicographic hierarchy of dimensions might solve collective decision problems when deliberation can generate agreement on a lexicographic order of importance of different issue-dimensions. In particular, the weights the individuals attach to each issue-dimension could be aggregated into such an overall lexicographic ordering. 71 But this aggregation problem is not immune to the Arrow and GibbardSatterthwaite problems either, and democracies may feel apprehensive about solving crossdimensional aggregation problems involving difficult matters of issue-priority by a mechanical decision procedure. Still, one could imagine debate on the relative weights of the dimensions of (say) ecology, employment and business. Because people's views on such weights are as changeable by deliberation as their preferences on alternatives, deliberation might produce agreement on a lexicographic hierarchy.
Logrolling. In practice, problems of cross-dimensional aggregation are often solved by logrolling rather than by explicit assignment of weights to dimensions. Under logrolling, intense minorities, as potential coalition partners in a majority coalition, can get their way on particular dimensions by threatening to block overall agreement. From a manipulability perspective, logrolling provides opportunities for misrepresentation of preference intensity. From a rational-choice perspective, it is excoriated for enabling coalitions of special interests to prevail over general interests.
But logrolling also provides information about preference intensity 72 and thus about what weights agents attach to different issue-dimensions. In deliberation, especially given (arg) and (ref), individuals have to justify their preferences in terms acceptable to others. One such way of justifying preference intensity is for an individual to indicate what he/she would be prepared to accept on other dimensions in return for getting his/her way on the dimension he/she cares about most. While this individual might still misrepresent this intensity, as we saw in section 3.2 lying about one's own preferences is potentially costly in deliberation.
Demonstrating the nature of the problem and crafting new alternatives. Even if there is no
straightforward solution to the cross-dimensional aggregation problem, the identification of the precise nature of the problem at issue, as offered by social-choice-theoretic analysis, is much more desirable than mere recognition of inconsistency as a result of a lack of structure in individual preferences. If at this juncture a seeming impasse is reached, at least two different conclusions can be drawn. One is that the information contained in the available profile(s) of personal preference orderings (even after unpacking issue-dimensions) is insufficient for reaching a decision in accordance with Arrow's conditions 73 -see section 3.5. Alternatively, the information from unpacking dimensions could be used to craft new alternatives, not yet contained in X. In our tariff example, the committee might, for instance, think about compensatory taxes and subsidies that would restore equity across industrial sectors should a selective tariff be adopted, or contemplate ways a non-discriminatory restricted tariff could be designed. 
Empirical Evidence
Although the empirical evidence on how deliberation affects preference structuration is limited, some recent findings corroborate our hypotheses in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
On the hypothesis that deliberation can increase endorsement of "generalizable interests", Gundersen, reporting a series of "deliberative interviews" on environmental issues, finds that in every case deliberation promoted commitment to the generalizable interest of ecological integrity. 75 On the hypothesis that deliberation induces greater single-peakedness, Pelletier et al administered Q-sorts to participants before and after a deliberative "search conference" on food supply policy in upstate New York. 76 Although this study does not measure single-peakedness as such, one result is that individuals who subscribed to two distinct positions before deliberation tended to subscribe to one or other of them (but not both) after deliberation. 77 This might suggest that deliberation leads individuals to identify more closely with their "peak". Fishkin's deliberative polls provide data for testing the hypothesis that preferences after deliberation exhibit a greater level of single-peakedness than preferences before deliberation. 
Relaxing Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
We now suggest: Positional rules, which are sensitive to the position of an alternative in each individual's ranking R i , are well-known such SWFs. 80 The Borda rule is the most famous example. 81 Given Why is hypothesis 4 plausible? The composition of the set of alternatives can itself be subjected to deliberation (or possibly to a decision by consensus or approval voting). Consider some experiments designed by Plott and Levine to demonstrate agenda manipulation, which involve subjects with induced preferences that they are told to keep secret from the others. 82 The subjects take a series of votes on how a set of five alternatives is to be partitioned; each subset is then voted on, and its winner goes to the next step, eventually producing an overall winner. The experiments generally went as expected, failing to choose the Condorcet winner and revealing ubiquitous agenda manipulation, which is why Riker says they "impress me deeply". 83 However, there was one exception: when the chair of one group allowed a straw vote at the outset, the group then converged on the Condorcet winner. This straw vote revealed that one of the five alternatives was least preferred by everyone, and so led to dropping that alternative from the set of relevant alternatives. This straw vote was functionally equivalent to the use of deliberation for demarcating the set of relevant alternatives, showing how such demarcation can limit the scope for agenda manipulation.
This process may itself seem vulnerable to strategic manipulation, though only to the extent individuals behave according to rational-choice precepts. If they do not, then deliberation can be used to decide on a procedure for distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant alternatives -conceivably The fact that deliberators could decide to restrict the set of relevant alternatives does not mean that they will do so. But there is a mechanism intrinsic to deliberation that promotes this likelihood, relating to the argumentative (arg) and reflective (ref) aspects. In deliberation, an individual cannot simply introduce or support an alternative; he/she must justify that preference in terms others can accept. Arguing strategically for an alternative that the individual does not truly support carries two risks. The first is that the argument may persuade others, inducing the group to choose that alternative. The second is that the individual may be exposed as a liar (either in argument or by subsequent voting behavior) -potentially incurring punishment as discussed in section 3.2.
To illustrate, assume the Borda rule is being used and there are three alternatives, x, y, z, with 65 deliberators preferring x to y to z, and 35 deliberators preferring y to z to x. With Borda scores of 130 for x, 135 for y, and 35 for z, a canny individual i sees that his favored alternative x will be beaten by y, but that introducing alternative w, which the 64 other proponents of x are likely to prefer to y, could change the situation. But now i must justify his (false) preference for w over x. Individual i may be prepared to lie here, but if the lie fails to convince others then i will suffer the penalties we mentioned in section 3.2. Other deliberators may well ask i why he chose to introduce w so late in the day; this, too, needs to be justified by i, and again there are penalties for lying. Moreover, if i has to argue against x to justify w, he risks convincing others that x (his true preference) is indeed undesirable.
In conclusion, if deliberation can demarcate the set of relevant alternatives in a publicy acceptable way, a violation of condition (I) may become defensible, and positional rules may become attractive SWFs.
Introducing More Information
While the responses discussed so far involve relaxation of one of Arrow's conditions, we now discuss a solution compatible with preserving, even strengthening, all the conditions. This may seem paradoxical: for Arrow shows that these conditions are mutually inconsistent. However, Sen argued that Arrow's impossibility result is driven by the informational limitations of Arrow's ordinalist framework. 84 If we allow interpersonal comparisons of preference intensity or of a suitable individual welfare measure, then there exist aggregation mechanisms satisfying all of Arrow's conditions.
We now assign to each individual i a personal welfare function W i : X → R, where
interpreted as a measure of the welfare of individual i under alternative x. A social welfare functional (SWFL as distinct from a SWF) is a function F whose input is a profile of personal welfare functions {W i } i∈N and whose output is a social ordering R. 85 Assumptions on measurability and interpersonal comparability of welfare are formalized by specifying the class of transformations with respect to which a SWFL is required to be invariant. 86 This class is also interpreted as the class of transformations up to which a profile of personal welfare functions is taken to be unique. The smaller this class of transformations, the more information is contained in a profile. 
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Examples of SWFLs satisfying the conditions of parts (i) and (ii) of theorem 7 are, respectively, the leximin rule and the utilitarian rule.
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The leximin-rule is a version of Rawls's (lexicographic) difference principle: make social choices to maximize the welfare-level of the worst-off individual; if there are ties, maximize, in a lexicographic order of priority, the welfare-levels of the second worst-off, third worst-off, ..., individuals. 91 The leximin rule satisfies not only the conditions of theorem 7(i), but also more demanding conditions of anonymity, positive responsiveness, separability and minimal equity. 92 The utilitarian rule is a version of the classical utilitarian principle: maximize the sum-total of the welfare of all individuals. The utilitarian rule satisfies not only the conditions of theorem 7(ii), but also anonymity, positive responsiveness, separability and continuity. 93 How could this escape-route from Arrow's theorem apply in a deliberative democracy?
Deliberation can concern not only first-order decisions on outcomes, but also second-order decisions Beyond these hypothetical examples, some real-world systems of government have produced results of the form of (i) and (ii). Corporatist government involves cooperation between encompassing labor and business federations, previously locked in a zero-sum distributional game. The agreements produced often constitute enduring distributive rules, with both an evaluation variable and an aggregation principle. For example, in Austria (the corporatist archetype) the Parity Commission for
Wages and Prices set up in 1957 made its decisions so as to maximize growth in national income while compensating those adversely affected by the resulting structural adjustment. 100 The evaluation variable is therefore income measured in conventional terms. The aggregation principle is a type of utilitarian Pareto criterion: maximize average income and fully compensate losers. The "social corporatist" Nordic countries, in contrast, favour an evaluation variable more akin to Rawlsian primary goods, with an income-invariant distribution of equal entitlements to these goods. 101 A recently introduced British deliberative body, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), develops principles in the form of (i) and (ii) for allocating expensive health care. NICE uses "basic opportunities" as an evaluation variable, determining whether to provide public funds for new drugs in terms of how different funding schemes for the drug would affect basic opportunities of citizens. 102 We do not suggest that deliberative democracy should convert all collective decision problems into type ID, only that, given democratic agreement, this route can be taken for some allocation and distribution problems. The arguments of the previous sections apply to the many remaining decision problems of type JD (possibly including second-order decisions on how to specify (i) and (ii)).
Conclusion
We have argued that the seemingly conflicting approaches of deliberative democracy and The role of deliberation is to bring about situations in which the antecedents of these "if-then" results are satisfied. The normative component of our argument is that the constraints required for bringing about such situations are either inherent in, or at least consistent with, core deliberative principles.
Moreover, our arguments rest on empirical hypotheses about the effects of deliberation. Whether or not deliberation will induce each of the antecedents of the "if-then" results ultimately depends on the specifics of particular cases.
While we have adduced available empirical evidence and illustrations in support of our hypotheses, more research is necessary to investigate deliberation's strength on each of the identified escape-routes from the social-choice-theoretic impossibility problems. But for the moment we conclude that deliberative democracy and social choice theory are mutually supportive. The former is concerned with identification of the functions that deliberation ought to, and indeed can, perform in democratic decision making, and the latter is concerned with the clarification of the logical properties of available procedures for solving the aggregation aspects of democratic decision problems. Thus social choice theory shows exactly what deliberation must accomplish in order to render collective decision making tractable and meaningful, suggesting that democracy must in the end have a deliberative aspect. 
